Unilateral declarations and the European Court of Human Rights. Between efficiency and the interests of the applicant by Glas, L.R.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/199630
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2019-06-02 and may be subject to
change.
Article
Unilateral declarations
and the European Court
of Human Rights: Between
efficiency and the interests
of the applicant
Lize R Glas*
Abstract
Faced with numerous repetitive applications, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has
welcomed the unilateral declaration mechanism as a way to handle these efficiently. In a unilateral
declaration, the state admits a human rights violation and promises to provide redress to the
applicant. On that basis, the Court strikes out an application and does not deal with its merits.
Some authors and non-governmental organizations warn against losing sight of the applicants’
interests whilst relying on unilateral declarations. Against this background, this article aims to
establish whether unilateral declarations are indeed (mostly) used to dispose of repetitive appli-
cations and how this procedure works in practice. The second aim is to determine whether the
interests of the applicants are sufficiently protected when the Court rules on unilateral declara-
tions. The analysis is based on all 1285 unilateral declarations, which the states parties to the ECHR
have proposed in the five years following 2 April 2012.
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1. Introduction
One of the major current challenges for the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is the large
number of repetitive applications: more than four out of ten applications are repetitive.1 Moreover,
the total number of repetitive applications increased from 30,500 in 2015 to 35,000 in 2016.2 Such
applications result from systemic domestic problems, which remain unresolved even though the
ECtHR has already addressed them in a previous judgment.3 These problems are, for example, the
length of civil proceedings in Italy, the non-enforcement or delayed enforcement of domestic
decisions in Ukraine and detention conditions in Russia.4 When deciding these applications, the
Court merely repeats its well-established case law. The ECtHR and the states parties therefore
agree that repetitive applications should be disposed of efficiently and that their root cause – the
failure to execute judgments properly – should be addressed.5 An innovation they have welcomed
in order to achieve the former aim is the Unilateral Declaration (UD).6 It is, therefore, unsurprising
that UDs have become a ‘routine procedure’ ever since Turkey proposed the first UD in 2001.7
In a UD, the respondent state admits a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) and promises to provide redress to the applicant. Instead of having to resolve the merits of
a complaint in a judgment, the ECtHR decides (more efficiently) if the UD constitutes a basis for
striking the application out of its list of cases.8
1. ECtHR, ‘High-level conference on the ‘‘implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights, our shared
responsibility,’’ Brussels Declaration’, European Court of Human Rights (2015), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Brussels_Declaration_ENG.pdf, preamble (Brussels Declaration (2015)); ECtHR, ‘Annual Report 2016’, European
Court of Human Rights (2017), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_report_2016_ENG.pdf, p. 16, 193
(European Court of Human Rights, Annual Report (2016)).
2. ECtHR, ‘Annual Report 2015’, European Court of Human Rights (2016), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Annual_report_2015_ENG.pdf, p. 8 (ECtHR Annual Report (2015)); ECtHR, ‘Annual Report 2016’, European Court
of Human Rights (2017), p. 16. Unlike the Annual Report 2015 and the Annual Report 2016, the Annual Report 2017
does not specify the number of repetitive cases pending.
3. Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH), ‘Report on the longer-term future of the system of the European
Convention on Human Rights’, CDDH (2015), https://www.coe.int/en/web/human-rights-intergovernmental-coopera
tion/echr-system/future-of-convention-system, p. 32.
4. See generally P.-Y. Le Borgn, ‘Implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights: 9th report
(provisional version)’, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2017), http://website-pace.net/documents/
19838/3115031/AS-JUR-2017-15-EN.pdf/18891586-7d6c-4297-b5f7-4077636db28e, p. 15.
5. Preamble to the Brussels Declaration (2015); ECtHR Annual Report (2016), p. 18; Council of Europe, ‘Copenhagen
Declaration’, Council of Europe (2018), https://rm.coe.int/copenhagen-declaration/16807b915c, para. 51 (Copenhagen
Declaration (2018)).
6. Council of Europe, ‘High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights Interlaken
Declaration’, Council of Europe (2010), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2010_Interlaken_FinalDeclaration_
ENG.pdf, para. D(7)(a)(i); Council of Europe, ‘High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human
Rights Izmir Declaration (2011)’, Council of Europe (2011), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2011_Izmir_Final
Declaration_ENG.pdf, para. E(1-2); Brussels Declaration (2015), para. 9; Copenhagen Declaration (2018), para. 54(a).
See also Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH), ‘Report on the longer-term future of the system of the
European Convention on Human Rights’, CDDH (2015), p. 179.
7. H. Keller, M. Forowicz and L. Engi, Friendly Settlements before the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford
University Press, 2010), p. 69; L.R. Glas, The Theory, Potential and Practice of Procedural Dialogue in the European
Convention on Human Rights System (Intersentia, 2016), p. 287.
8. Additionally, UDs may be encouraged because, ‘an adequate solution at the national level, even if belated’ should be
preferred over a judgment of the ECtHR in the light of the subsidiarity principle, see B. Myjer, ‘It Is Never Too Late for
the State – Friendly Settlements and Unilateral Declarations’, in L. Caflisch et al. (eds.) Human Rights – Strasbourg
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Considering the background against which UDs have been introduced, two questions arise.
The first question is whether UDs are indeed (mostly) used to dispose of repetitive applications
and how this works in practice. The first aim of the article is to answer this question. For this aim,
the types of cases in which UDs are approved will be studied and the way in which the Court
deals with UDs in its rulings will be analysed. This analysis will confirm that the ECtHR mostly
uses UDs for the said purpose. The second question is whether the Court’s efficiency drive,
which is at least part of its motivation for accepting UDs, leads it to neglect, in practice, the
interests of the applicants whose applications it strikes out based on a UD. A critical non-
governmental organisation has remarked, for example, that some UDs do not fully cover the
damages suffered by the applicant.9 The second aim of this article is, therefore, to establish
whether the ECtHR protects the interests of the applicants adequately when UDs are at play.10 It
can be assumed that their interests are protected adequately on paper at least by the rules on UDs
in the Court, the Rules of Court of the ECtHR (Rules of the Court) and the Strasbourg case law.
This can be assumed because the Court has developed safeguards in the Rules of the Court and in
its case law ever since it accepted the first UDs. Furthermore, these safeguards have remedied11
the criticism levelled against the ECtHR’s early practice of accepting UDs.12 Additionally, most
critical remarks were made before the Court formulated specific rules for accepting UDs.13
Besides, the non-governmental organization is not so much critical of the rules, as it is of the
Views / Droits de l’homme – Regards de Strasbourg. Liber Amicorum Luzius Wildhaber (N.P. Engel Publishers, 2007),
p. 323. This principle dictates that it is primarily the responsibility of the states parties to protect the Convention rights;
L.R. Glas, The Theory, Potential and Practice of Procedural Dialogue in the European Convention on Human Rights
System, p. 24-28.
9. Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, ‘Victors Jeronovicˇs v Latvia Written Comments’, Helsinki Foundation for
Human Rights (2015), http://www.hfhrpol.waw.pl/precedens/images/Amicus_unilateral_declarations.pdf, p. 6–7.
10. See also M.B. Dembour, ‘‘‘Finishing off’’ Cases: The Radical Solution to the Problem of the Expanding ECHR
Caseload’, 5 European Human Rights Law Review (2002), p. 604, 618.
11. The four major points of criticism and their remedies are summarized here. First, according to Sardaro (P. Sardaro, ‘Jus
non dicere for allegations of serious violations of human rights: questionable trends in the recent case-law of the
Strasbourg ECtHR’, 6 European Human Rights Law Review (2003), p. 601, 622), the ECtHR failed ‘to provide any
significant indications concerning the elements and guiding criteria which were taken into account’ and, according to
Leach (P. Leach, Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights (3rd edition, Oxford University Press, 2011)), p.
72), Article 37(1)(c) of the ECHR is an ‘ill-defined’ provision. Remedy: the ECtHR has formulated guiding criteria in
Tahsin Acar and Rule 62A of the Rules of the Court (European Court of Human Rights, ‘Rules of Procedure’, European
Court of Human Rights (2018), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf); Second, Sardaro and
Loucaides (ECtHR, Tog˘cu v Turkey, Application No. 27601/95, Judgment of 9 April 2002, Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Loucaides) have noted that compensation could be ex gratia in nature and that the state was not required to admit
responsibility for a violation in the individual case. Remedy: Rule 62A(1)(b) of the Rules of the Court requires that the
UD clearly acknowledges a violation; Third, according to Sardaro, some respondent states only undertook to take ‘some
general measures’, which would not have ‘any impact whatsoever on the present individual cases’. Remedy: Rule
62A(1)(b) of the Rules of the Court requires that the state must undertake to provide adequate redress and, as appropriate,
to take necessary remedial measures in the UD; Fourth, according to Leach, violations ‘arguably [had] not been ade-
quately resolved by the Government’s proposed terms’ and, according to Keller, Forowicz and Engi, ‘[i]n some cases, the
Court accepted a [UD] based on a questionable offer from the respondent Government’. Remedy: Rule 62A of the Rules
of the Court require, as noted already, that the state acknowledges a violation and that it provides adequate redress.
12. L.R. Glas, The Theory, Potential and Practice of Procedural Dialogue in the European Convention on Human Rights
System, p. 290; C. Rozakis, ‘Unilateral Declarations as a Means of Settling Human Rights Disputes: A New Tool for
the Resolution of Disputes in the ECHR’s Procedure’, in M. Kohen (ed.), Promoting Justice, Human Rights and
Conflict Resolution through International Law; Liber Amicorum Lucius Caflisch (Brill, 2007), p. 1013.
13. The ECtHR adopted the Rule on UDs (Rule 62A of the Rules of the Court) on 1 September 2012.
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Court’s observance of the rules in practice.14 For the second aim, the content of the UDs and the
ECtHR’s scrutiny thereof will be analysed so as to establish whether these rules are complied
with. Since the applicants’ interests naturally extend beyond the UD to its implementation and
effect on their domestic cases, the article also looks into these matters. The answer to the second
research question will clarify that that the applicants’ interests are guarded well generally, but
that improvements are possible as well.
The analysis is based on the 1285 UDs that the states parties have proposed in the five-year
period following 2 April 2012. On that date, Rule 62A of the Rules of the Court on UDs entered
into force. Since the article relies inter alia on this rule for its analysis, the date of entry-into-force
of the Rule is an appropriate starting point. The length of the period should provide a solid basis for
the analysis, and the period is more recent than the one the other studies covered.15
Before moving on to the analyses, the article includes a short note on the methodology (section
2) and outlines the relevant rules (section 3) and some figures (section 4). These, inter alia, help
gain insight into the type of cases in which the UDs are submitted. This is done in section 5. Section
6 analyses UDs in light of the relevant rules. Section 7 analyses what happens after an application
is struck out based on a UD. The conclusion (section 8) analyses the findings in light of the two
aims as outlined above and makes recommendations.
2. Methodology
The relevant rulings were found by entering these keywords into the ECtHR’s case-law database
Human Rights Documentation (HUDOC): ‘unilateral declaration’ and ‘de´claration unilate´rale’. It
is unclear if all the relevant rulings of the Committees were found through this method. This would
not have been the case if the Committees of three judges had struck out the applications based on
UDs in letters and not in decisions, as the Court does not publish letters on HUDOC. Committees
may use letters when no ‘further examination’ of a case is needed,16 something that is presumably
needed if a UD is filed, which makes it unlikely that they approve UDs in letters.
Both the number of cases in which a UD was proposed and the number of affected applicants are
noted, considering that multiple applications can be joined in one case and that as many as 6617
applicants can file one application.18 To compare, the Court’s figures are in terms of applica-
tions,19 which does not reveal the number of applicants affected by the UDs. Since this article is
concerned with the interests of the applicant, it is logical to use the numbers of applicants. The
14. Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, ‘Victors Jeronovicˇs v Latvia Written Comments’, Helsinki Foundation for
Human Rights (2015), p. 9.
15. H. Keller and D. Suter, ‘Friendly Settlements and Unilateral Declarations: An Analysis of the ECtHR’s Case Law after
the Entry into Force of Protocol No. 14’, in S. Besson (ed.), The European Court of Human Rights after Protocol 14 –
Preliminary Assessment and Perspectives (Schulthess, 2011) (concerns the period: 1 June 2010–31 May 2011); H.
Keller, M. Forowicz and L. Engi, Friendly Settlements before the European Court of Human Rights (concerns the
period before that).
16. Article 28(1)(a) of the ECHR; Rule 53(5) of the Rules of the Court.
17. Application with application number 39336/12.
18. Rules 42(1), 53(7), 71(1) of the Rules of the Court; European Court of Human Rights, ‘Practice Direction, ‘Institution
of proceedings’, European Convention on Human Rights (2016), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/PD_institution_
proceedings_ENG.pdf, para. 14; H. Keller and D. Suter, in S. Besson (ed.), The European Court of Human Rights after
Protocol 14 – Preliminary Assessment and Perspectives, p. 56.
19. Committee of Minister, 10th Annual Report of the Committee of Ministers (2016), p. 78.
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number of applicants who rejected a UD and who did not comment is not specified because the
ECtHR does not always specify this.20
The content of the UDs is known, because the Court either reproduces the UD or summarizes its
content in its decisions and judgments. The ECtHR also includes the applicants’ observations on
the UD and paraphrases their motivation for accepting or rejecting the UD, if they give a motiva-
tion at all.21 Furthermore, the ECtHR virtually always states if it rejects or approves a UD.
3. Relevant rules
The relevant rules are discussed chronologically and derived from the ECHR, the ECtHR’s case-
law, and the Rules of the Court.
A. Article 39 of the ECHR
The original text of the ECHR already provided for the possibility that the ECtHR would not rule
on the merits of a complaint, but strike out a case when the parties agreed to a friendly settlement.22
Those settlements are currently regulated in Article 39 ECHR. This provision is relevant to UDs,
because the ECtHR regards the UD as a friendly settlement and applies Article 39 ECHR when the
applicant accepts a UD. Friendly settlement negotiations are confidential and both parties must
agree to the settlement.23 The decision in which the ECtHR strikes out an application briefly
summarizes the terms of the settlement. This decision is transmitted to the Committee of Ministers
(Committee) so that it can supervise the execution of the settlement.24
B. Article 37 of the ECHR
In 1990, the states extended the possibilities for striking out applications, in addition to the
possibility in Article 39 ECHR, by adding the predecessor of the current Article 37 ECHR to
the ECHR.25 This provision permits the ECtHR to strike out an application on the ground that the
applicant does not intend to pursue the application; the matter has been resolved; or it is no longer
justified to continue examining an application for any other reason.
The ECtHR usually uses the last ground to strike out cases in which the respondent state
proposed a UD. The Court cannot strike out a case on these grounds if respect for the ECHR
rights necessitates examining a complaint, a requirement that will be referred to as the ‘human
rights requirement’. The second paragraph of Article 37 ECHR specifies that the Court may restore
an application to its list if the circumstances so justify.
20. In one case, the ECtHR did not specify in respect of which applications the state adopted a UD. This case was therefore
not taken into consideration, see ECtHR, Klepikov and Others v. Russia, Application No. 3400/06, Judgment of 24
November 2016, para. 6.
21. H. Keller and D. Suter, in S. Besson (ed.), The European Court of Human Rights after Protocol 14 – Preliminary
Assessment and Perspectives, p. 82.
22. Article 28(5) of the ECHR.
23. Article 39(2) of the ECHR.
24. Article 39(4) of the ECHR.
25. Article 6 of Protocol No. 8 to the ECHR.
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C. The Tahsin Acar factors
It took until 2001 for Turkey to adopt the first ever UD and to suggest that the ECtHR strikes out
the application under Article 37(1)(c) ECHR. The Court followed the suggestion.26 Subsequently,
in the Tahsin Acar v. Turkey judgment of 2003, the Court gave a non-exhaustive list of relevant
factors to assess whether it can strike out a case in conformity with the human rights requirement.27
These factors are:28
 the nature of the complaint;
 whether the issues raised are comparable to those already determined by it;
 the nature and scope of any measures taken by the state in the context of the execution of its
judgments and the impact of these measures on the case at issue; and
 whether the parties are in dispute regarding the facts.
D. Rule 62A of the Rules of the Court
Rule 62A incorporates two Tahsin Acar factors, turning them into essential requirements for approving
a UD, as these ‘shall’ be included. These requirements are that the state must ‘clearly’ acknowledge a
violation of the ECHR in the applicant’s case and undertake to ‘provide adequate redress and, as
appropriate, to take necessary remedial measures’.29 Apart from these rules regarding the content, Rule
62A also contains a requirement regarding the timing: the state should file a UD after an attempt to
reach a friendly settlement, save ‘where exceptional circumstances so justify’.30 UDs must further-
more be filed ‘in public and adversarial proceedings conducted separately from and with due respect
for the confidentiality of any friendly-settlement proceedings’.31 Unlike in the case of a friendly
settlement, the applicant does not need to approve the UD,32 though (s)he has the opportunity to
submit observations,33 and the Committee does not supervise the execution of UDs normally as it
will be explained in section 7. As was noted when discussing Article 37 ECHR, the ECtHR cannot
strike out a case if the human rights requirement is not fulfilled. As UDs are struck out based on Article
37 ECHR, this requirement also applies to UDs in addition to the requirements in Rule 62A.
4. Figures
As Table 1 shows,34 the ECtHR accepted the UD for 90.51% of the applicants and rejected it for
3.14% of them. As for the remaining applicants (6.35%), the ECtHR accepted the UD as a friendly
settlement because the applicant had accepted the document. Therefore, when a state submits a
UD, the ECtHR is likely to strike out the case. It is even more likely that the ECtHR will strike out a
case based on a friendly settlement than reject a UD.
26. ECtHR, Akman v. Turkey, Application No. 37453/97, Judgment of 26 June 2001, para. 23.
27. ECtHR, Tahsin Acar v. Turkey, Application No. 26307/95, Judgment of 6 May 2003, para. 75, 77.
28. Ibid., para. 76.
29. Rule 62A(1)(b) of the Rules of the Court.
30. Rules 62A(1)(a) and 62A(2) of the Rules of the Court.
31. Rule 62A(1)(c) of the Rules of the Court.
32. Rule 62A(3) of the Rules of the Court.
33. European Court of Human Rights, ‘Unilateral declarations: policy and practice’, European Court of Human Rights
(2012), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Unilateral_declarations_ENG.pdf, p. 1.
34. See Appendix I at the end of this article.
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Applicants are less inclined to accept UDs; only 10.51% of them did. The other applicants either
did not respond or rejected it. These figures are not so surprising, because the state files a UD after
friendly-settlement negotiations fail, which already indicates that the applicant wants the ECtHR to
examine the complaint.
Table 2 gives an insight into the number of UDs filed in all, and per state. In the five-year period
of interest, 12,007 applicants (in 1285 cases) were confronted with a UD. The number of UDs per
state differs widely: 10 states have never submitted a UD, 24 have submitted it for 1–50 applicants,
and six states for 51–100 applicants. The remaining seven states are Poland (140 applicants); the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM; 191 applicants); Turkey (484 applicants);
Romania (546 applicants); Russia (932 applicants); Ukraine (2600 applicants), and Italy (6380
applicants, of which 3055 are in one case35).
5. Types of cases
The ECtHR approves UDs in cases with very different complaints. Nevertheless, UDs most
frequently feature in cases concerning structural problems that cause repetitive applications.36
This is apparent from the fact that six/five of the seven states that issued UDs in respect of most
applicants overlapped with the states appearing in the Court’s top 10 of states with the most
pending cases in 2017.37 UDs are therefore mostly used in cases in which the ECtHR and states
parties consider them to be of special benefit.
6. Analysis of UDs in the light of relevant rules
This section analyses the UDs and the ECtHR’s rulings in light of the relevant rules, but first makes
some general observations.
Most UDs are short: the state acknowledges a violation and promises to pay a sum of money to
the applicant. It, thus, abides by the two requirements in Rule 62A (the state must clearly acknowl-
edge a violation and must undertake to provide adequate redress). If the UD is more elaborate, the
state, for example, briefly explains the facts, the domestic law38 or the circumstances in which it
accepts the violation.39 The state expresses regret only exceptionally.40 In repetitive cases and
especially if multiple applications are joined, the ECtHR usually gives a general description of the
35. ECtHR, Bellezza and Others v. Italy, Application No. 10221/09, Judgment of 19 March 2015.
36. H. Keller and D. Suter, in S. Besson (ed.), The European Court of Human Rights after Protocol 14 – Preliminary
Assessment and Perspectives, p. 63.
37. The ‘exception’ is the FYROM in the ECtHR’s statistics, see European Court of Human Rights, ‘Annual Report 2017’,
European Court of Human Rights (2018), https://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p¼ECtHR/annualreports&c, p.
165; The ‘exceptions’ are the FYROM and Poland in the Committee’s statistics, see Committee of Ministers, Annual
Report 2017 of the Committee of Ministers (2018), 64–66; P.-Y. Le Borgn, ‘Implementation of judgments of the European
Court of Human Rights: 9th report (provisional version)’, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2017), p. 5.
38. E.g. ECtHR, Zavaros v. Cyprus Application No. 7292/10, Judgment of 29 March 2016; ECtHR, Wilson v. the UK,
Application No. 65084/1, Judgment of 21 June 2016; ECtHR, Ilnseher v. Germany, Application No. 10211/12,
Judgment of 2 January 2017.
39. ECtHR, Bayliss v. the UK, Application No. 440/10, Judgment of 10 June 2014; ECtHR, Black v. the UK, Application
No. 23543/11, Judgment of 1 July 2014; ECtHR, Hill v. the UK, Application No. 22853/09, Judgment of 7 April 2015.
40. E.g. ECtHR, Wiesman v the Netherlands, Application No. 49111/08, Judgment of 4 November 2014; ECtHR, Sana-
diradze v. Georgia, Application No. 64566/09, Judgment of 8 April 2015; ECtHR, Vlahovic v Montenegro, Application
No. 62444/10, Judgment of 22 November 2016.
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facts without reference to the individual cases; the applicants’ details are listed in the Appendix.41
The ECtHR’s review of a UD is usually limited to verifying if the two requirements in Rule 62A
are included, normally without actually invoking Rule 62A,42 and if it already has established clear
and extensive case-law concerning the topic of the complaint. If the ECtHR rejects a UD, it usually
states its reason for doing so, but the exact reason for rejection is not always clear, as it sometimes
just notes that it has rejected the respondent state’s request.43
A. Article 39 of the ECHR
As noted, if the applicant expressly agrees to a UD, the ECtHR interprets the document as a
friendly settlement and strikes out the case under Article 39 ECHR.44 The ECtHR’s practice in
this respect was not fully consistent. In comparable circumstances, it struck cases out under Article
37(1)(b) ECHR,45 without referring to a specific legal basis in the dictum46 or as a UD under
Article 37(1)(c) ECHR.47 The latter is ‘by definition impossible’ since the applicant has accepted
the terms.48 In the last year studied, the ECtHR’s practice had become consistent, because it dealt
with all accepted UDs as a friendly settlement. Table 1 confirms this: the number of applicants who
accepted a UD – 398 – equalled the number of applicants in whose case a friendly settlement was
concluded.
B. Article 37 of the ECHR
In a few cases in which the state had proposed a UD, the ECtHR noted that it had invited the
applicant to comment on it, whilst drawing attention to Article 37(1)(a) ECHR (‘the applicant does
not intend to pursue his application’). Since the applicant had not replied, the ECtHR struck out the
application based on that provision.49 This practice is remarkable because the ECtHR has very
often noted that the applicants have not commented, without concluding that they no longer intend
to pursue their application. Moreover, since the declaration is unilateral, it is not logical to make
striking out a case on that basis dependent upon the applicants’ observations.
41. E.g. ECtHR, Smirnov and Others v. Ukraine, Application No. 38083/04, Judgment of 5 June 2012.
42. See L.R. Glas, The Theory, Potential and Practice of Procedural Dialogue in the European Convention on Human
Rights System, p. 290.
43. E.g. ECtHR, Dochnal v. Poland, Application No. 31622/07, Judgment of 18 September 2012, para. 69; ECtHR,
Themeli v. Albania, Application No. 63756/09, Judgment of 15 January 2013, para. 18; ECtHR, Masˇirevic´ v. Serbia,
Application No. 30671/08, Judgment of 11 February 2014, para. 37.
44. E.g. ECtHR, Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, Application No. 65656/12, Judgment of 16 December 2014.
45. ECtHR, Romand and Others v. UK, Application No. 26678/07, Judgment of 2 May 2012; ECtHR, Shvaydak v. Russia,
Application No. 18853/06, Judgment of 2 November 2013.
46. ECtHR, Legendi v. Hungary, Application No. 27814/09, Judgment of 3 April 2012; ECtHR, Shvaydak v. Russia.
47. ECtHR, Koziol v. Germany, Application No. 70904/10, Judgment of 17 September 2012; ECtHR, Mihalcea v.
Romania, Application No. 39602/13, Judgment of 24 June 2014; See also H. Keller and D. Suter, in S. Besson (ed.),
The European Court of Human Rights after Protocol 14 – Preliminary Assessment and Perspectives, p. 83.
48. H. Keller and D. Suter, in S. Besson (ed.), The European Court of Human Rights after Protocol 14 – Preliminary
Assessment and Perspectives, p. 83.
49. E.g. ECtHR, Ta˘nase v. Romania, Application No. 52968/09, Judgment of 17 December 2012; ECtHR, Khodar and
Others v. Russia, Application No. 14543/06, Judgment of 1 October 2013, para. 28; ECtHR, Ienciu v. Romania,
Application No. 60255/08, Judgment of 17 December 2015.
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C. The Tahsin Acar factors
1. Nature of the complaint
According to an information document, the ECtHR examines UDs ‘submitted in sensitive or
complex cases, and those concerning the most serious human rights abuses ( . . . ) with particular
care and attention’.50 Nevertheless, and as it has been explained in section 5, the ECtHR approves
UDs in many different types of cases, including Article 2 (right to life) and 3 ECHR (prohibition of
torture) cases, and does so seemingly irrespective of the nature of the complaint. Moreover, in one
case, even when the ECtHR alluded to the ‘serious nature of the allegations made’, and then
rejected the UD, this was not the sole reason for rejection. The ECtHR also relied on the fact that
the state did not agree to take general measures,51 which can be a reason for refusal on its own.52
The first Tahsin Acar factor (the nature of the complaint), therefore, does not seem to play a role of
major importance, though the ECtHR can refer to it.53
2. Not a new issue
In virtually all rulings, the ECtHR verifies whether it has established clear and extensive case-law
concerning the topic of the complaint.54 It, thus, ascertains whether the issue raised is comparable
to those it has determined already.55 The absence of such case-law can be a reason to reject a UD.
The Court continued to examine an Azerbaijani case, for example, because it had not yet examined
the merits of any complaint in respect of the violations that were specific to the 2010 elections.56 In
other rulings, however, it was sufficient that the relevant case-law existed in the form of judgments
issued against states other than the respondent state.57
3. Previous execution measures
As will be explained in section 6.C.1, the failure to take general measures in response to previous
judgments may be a reason for the ECtHR to continue examining an application. The opposite also
holds: the ECtHR may not be convinced of ‘the usefulness of another judgment on the merits’
when the state has already taken relevant execution measures.58 Nevertheless, the ECtHR usually
50. ECtHR, ‘Unilateral declarations: policy and practice’, ECtHR (2012), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Uni-
lateral_declarations_ENG.pdf, p. 1.
51. ECtHR, Przemyk v. Poland, Application No. 22426/11, Judgment of 17 September 2013, para. 41; ECtHR, Tahirov v.
Azerbaijan, Application No. 31953/11, Judgment of 11 June 2015, para. 40.
52. ECtHR, Zherebin v. Russia, Application No. 51445/09, Judgment of 24 March 2016, para. 42.
53. L.R. Glas, The Theory, Potential and Practice of Procedural Dialogue in the European Convention on Human Rights
System, p. 292-293.
54. See for exceptions ECtHR, Morozan v. Moldova, Application No. 6503/04, Judgment of 5 June 2012; ECtHR, Herman
v. the Netherlands, Application No. 35965/14, Judgment of 17 November 2015; ECtHR, Zavros v. Cyprus, Application
No. 7292/10, Judgment of 29 March 2016.
55. See L.R. Glas, The Theory, Potential and Practice of Procedural Dialogue in the European Convention on Human
Rights System, p. 293.
56. ECtHR, Tahirov v Azerbaijan, para. 39; see also ECtHR, Vyerentsov v. Ukraine, Application No. 20372/11, Judgment
of 11 November 2013, para. 45.
57. ECtHR, Jeronovicˇs v. Latvia, Application No. 547/02, Judgment of 10 February 2009, para. 52 (outside five-year
period); ECtHR, Union of Jehovah’s Witnesses of Georgia and Others v. Georgia, Application No. 72874/01, Judg-
ment of 21 April 2015, para. 25.
58. ECtHR, Gergely v. Romania, Application No. 57885/00, Judgment of 26 April 2007, para. 26 (outside five-year
period).
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does not verify whether such measures have been taken whilst approving a UD relating to a
structural problem.59
4. No disputed facts
The last relevant factor is whether there is a dispute regarding the facts presented by the parties.
This factor was a bar to the approval of the UD in the Tahsin Acar case,60 but did not play a role of
any importance in the scrutinized rulings.61 When the applicants submitted that there was a
disagreement regarding the facts in another case, the ECtHR rejected the UD, but not for this
reason.62 In another case, it did not address the existing dispute about the facts.63
D. Rule 62A of the Rules of the Court
1. Filed after a friendly settlement
According to an information document of the ECtHR, exceptional circumstances that justify the
passing over of friendly-settlement negotiations exist when a case is repetitive.64 It is odd to
qualify repetitive cases as an exceptional circumstance, because repetitive cases are very com-
mon.65 The ECtHR, therefore, permits passing over these negotiations not just in exceptional
circumstances. It cannot be known how often negotiations are omitted, as the ECtHR does not
always mention that the UD was filed after negotiations and because it is not clear if the negoti-
ations took place or not when the ECtHR does not mention them.66 The absence of such negoti-
ations is not a reason for the ECtHR to reject a UD. On the contrary, in a couple of Georgian cases,
the ECtHR recalled that it might exceptionally accept a UD in the absence of negotiations. At least
one of these cases was clearly not repetitive as Georgia admitted a violation of Article 11 ECHR
(freedom of assembly and association),67 a violation that the ECtHR had not yet found in respect of
that state.68 Some of the other cases were hardly repetitive either, in view of the (combination of)
violations admitted.69 The ECtHR did not explain why an exception was warranted in these cases.
59. L.R. Glas, The Theory, Potential and Practice of Procedural Dialogue in the European Convention on Human Rights
System, p. 293.
60. ECtHR, Tahsin Acar v. Turkey, para. 78.
61. L.R. Glas, The Theory, Potential and Practice of Procedural Dialogue in the European Convention on Human Rights
System, p. 294.
62. ECtHR, Tunyan and Others v. Armenia, Application No. 22812/05, Judgment of 9 October 2012; see also ECtHR,
Danielyan and Others v. Armenia, Application No. 25825/05, Judgment of 9 October 2012.
63. ECtHR, Khalil v. Azerbaijan, Application No. 60659/08, Judgment of 6 October 2015.
64. ECtHR, ‘Unilateral declarations: policy and practice’, ECtHR (2012), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Uni-
lateral_declarations_ENG.pdf, p. 1.
65. See sections 1 and 5.
66. L.R. Glas, The Theory, Potential and Practice of Procedural Dialogue in the European Convention on Human Rights
System, p. 292.
67. ECtHR, Union of Jehovah’s Witnesses of Georgia and Others v. Georgia, para. 18.
68. No results of before 21 April 2015 appear when searching on HUDOC with the criteria ‘respondent state: Georgia’ and
‘Violation: 11’.
69. ECtHR, Beridze v. Georgia, Application No. 28297/10, Judgment of 15 September 2015, para. 14 (admission of
violation of Articles 3 and 11 ECHR, the ECtHR had found a violation of both these articles in a Georgian case twice);
ECtHR, Tedliashvili and Others v. Georgia, Application No. 64987/14, Judgment of 24 November 2015) (admission of
violation of procedural limb of Article 2 ECHR because of alleged suicide in prison, the ECtHR had found such a
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2. Acknowledgement of a violation
This section analyses the scope and the precision of the acknowledgments. Additionally, it discusses
ex gratia payments, a practice that is incompatible with the requirement of an acknowledgment.
Applicants rejected various UDs, because their scope was said to be too limited, as the UDs
were only concerned with one of the complaints.70 The limited scope of a UD does not, however,
prevent its approval because the ECtHR can strike out part of the application based on the UD and
deal with the remainder of the complaint by declaring it inadmissible or by deciding it on its
merits.71 Also, the ECtHR once invited the state to amend the terms of the UD to reflect the full
complaint.72 In other cases, the limited scope meant that the ECtHR rejected the UD, for example,
because the acknowledgment only covered part of the applicant’s detention.73
The states sometimes limit the scope of their acknowledgment by adding that the violation took
place ‘in the special circumstances’ of the applicant’s case.74 Thus, they probably want to stress
that not a structural problem, but a hiccup in their system of human rights protection (which works
well in principle), caused the violation. Yet, one can wonder whether this image always reflects the
reality. To illustrate, the FYROM added such a clause in 38 cases of the 169 applicants who
complained about a violation of their right to a hearing within a reasonable time75 and Georgia
added it in 10 cases of 11 applicants complaining about deficiencies in the course of medical
treatment in prison.76 Considering these numbers, the circumstances were hardly ‘special’.
Two states were imprecise in two cases, because they did not acknowledge a violation at all.
The ECtHR rejected both UDs for that reason.77 Acknowledging a violation is, therefore, indeed
an essential requirement. It is more common for the state to be imprecise because it just
notes that ‘the interference in this case does not conform with the requirements of the
violation once); see also ECtHR, Tsaguria v. Georgia, Application No. 65969/09, Judgment of 15 September 2015;
ECtHR, Menabde v. Georgia, Application No. 4731/10, Judgment of 13 October 2015.
70. E.g. ECtHR, Galiullin and Others v. Russia, Application No. 51816/09, Judgment of 28 May 2013; ECtHR, Zierd v.
Germany, Application No. 75095/11, Judgment of 8 April 2014; ECtHR, Wygoca v. Poland, Application No. 6738/12,
Judgment of 22 November 2016.
71. E.g. ECtHR, Tommaso v. Italy, Application No. 43395/09, Judgment of 27 February 2017, para. 133.
72. ECtHR, Kalinin v. Russia, Application No. 54749/12, Judgment of 19 February 2015, para. 11.
73. E.g. ECtHR, Sorokin v. Russia, Application No. 67482/10, Judgment of 10 October 2013, para. 21; ECtHR, Berger v.
Russia, Application No. 66414/11, Judgment of 13 March 2014, para. 12; ECtHR, Zavorin v. Russia, Application No.
42080/11, Judgment of 15 January 2015, para. 17.
74. ECtHR, Kiisa v. Estonia, Application No. 16587/10, Judgment of 13 March 2014, para. 43; see also ECtHR, Hill v. UK,
Application No. 22853/09, Judgment of 7 April 2015; ECtHR, Daravels v. the FYROM, Application No. 48807/08,
Judgment of 19 May 2015.
75. These cases can be found on HUDOC with the key words ‘in the special circumstances’, ‘unilateral declaration’,
‘hearing within a reasonable time’, ‘respondent state: FYROM’ and ‘Date: 02/04/2012 – 01/04/2017’. One case
appears twice because the ECtHR restored if for unclear reasons.
76. ECtHR, Khokhiashvili v. Georgia, Application No. 65594/09, Judgment of 7 December 2009 (before five-year period);
ECtHR, Mamulashvili v. Georgia, Application No. 71672/10, Judgment of 6 May 2014; ECtHR, Bakradze v. Georgia,
Application No. 3658/10, Judgment of 20 May 2014; ECtHR, Abzianidze v. Georgia, Application No. 23715/09,
Judgment of 27 May 2014; ECtHR, Basilashvili v. Georgia, Application No. 51603/09, Judgment of 27 May 2014;
ECtHR, Tibilashvili v. Georgia, Application No. 16516/10, Judgment of 27 May 2014; ECtHR, Japaridze v. Georgia,
Application No. 35199/10, Judgment of 27 May 2014; ECtHR, Miminoshvili v. Georgia, Application No. 10300/07,
Judgment of 24 June 2014; ECtHR, Oboladze and Lobzhanidze v. Georgia, Application No. 31197/06, Judgment of 24
March 2015; ECtHR, Kvarelashvili v. Georgia, Application No. 28987/08, Judgment of 16 June 2015.
77. ECtHR, Rous v. Sweden, Application No. 27183/04, Judgment of 25 July 2013, para. 75; ECtHR, Allahverdiyev v.
Azerbaijan, Application No. 49192/08, Judgment of 6 March 2014, para. 33.
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Convention’,78 without referring to a specific provision. This was not a reason for rejection,
although it is doubtful whether such an admission abides by the requirement in Rule 62A that the
state ‘clearly’ acknowledges a violation.
Even when the UD refers to a specific provision, the acknowledgments are ‘usually ( . . . )
vague’.79 The applicants may reject a UD for this reason and more specifically, for example, because
it was unclear precisely which acts in the course of an investigation were in breach of Article 3
ECHR80 or because a breach of that Article was admitted, but not that torture took place.81 The
ECtHR did not respond to these reasons for the rejection of the applicants in the cases cited. Nor did it
reject other UDs for being imprecise. In conclusion, rather general admissions of a violation suffice.
The states offered to pay ex gratia a sum of money in a number of cases, meaning that they pay
without recognising liability.82 Although this contradicts the requirement of an acknowledgment,83
it was not a reason for rejection for the ECtHR.84 It did not even comment on the ex gratia nature of
the payment in most cases.85 When it did, it noted that the state did acknowledge a violation and
offered redress and then approved the UD.86
3. Redress
This section first discusses the individual measures of redress that a state can undertake. Such
measures can be of a monetary or a non-monetary nature. After that, the section examines under-
takings of a general nature.
The ECtHR rejected most UDs because the sum of money was inadequate.87 The applicants
most often rejected UDs for the same reason. This leads to the following question: when does a
sum qualify as ‘adequate redress’ in line with Rule 62A?
78. E.g. ECtHR, Sag˘altıcı v. Turkey, Application No. 27670/10, Judgment of 15 September 2015; ECtHR, Tomovski and
Others v. the FYROM, Application No. 52471/08, Judgment of 15 March 2016; ECtHR, _I laslan v. Turkey, Appli-
cation No. 69775/11, Judgment of 14 June 2016.
79. Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, ‘Victors Jeronovicˇs v Latvia Written Comments’, Helsinki Foundation for
Human Rights (2015), p. 2.
80. ECtHR, M.P. v. Poland, Application No. 20416/13, Judgment of 6 December 2016, para. 10.
81. ECtHR, Morozan v. Moldova, Application No. 6503/04, Judgment of 5 June 2012, para. 9; see also ECtHR, Tsiklauri
v. Georgia, Application No. 1775/09, Judgment of 6 May 2014, para. 10.
82. E.g. ECtHR, Prenko v. Ukraine, Application No. 7490/06, Judgment of 25 September 2012; ECtHR, Rosuljasˇ v.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Application No. 75572/11, Judgment of 1 April 2014; ECtHR, Mihani v. Albania,
Application No. 47760/09, Judgment of 13 September 2016; see also O. Ichim, Just Satisfaction under the European
Convention on Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 195.
83. ECtHR, ‘Unilateral declarations: policy and practice’, ECtHR (2012), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Uni-
lateral_declarations_ENG.pdf, p. 2.
84. Outside this period it was a reason for rejection, see H. Keller and D. Suter, in S. Besson (ed.), The European Court of
Human Rights after Protocol 14 – Preliminary Assessment and Perspectives, p. 84.
85. E.g. ECtHR, Chernova v. Ukraine, Application No. 16429/04, Judgment of 17 April 2012; ECtHR, Karpenko and
Others v. Russia, Application No. 2355/06, Judgment of 17 February 2015; ECtHR, Tu¨rkes¸ and Kaplan v. Turkey,
Application No. 23700/12, Judgment of 10 January 2017; L.R. Glas, The Theory, Potential and Practice of Proce-
dural Dialogue in the European Convention on Human Rights System, p. 291.
86. ECtHR, Demchenko and Others v. Ukraine, Application No. 39896/05 et al., Judgment of 10 April 2012; ECtHR,
Smirnov and Others v. Ukraine; ECtHR, Mihani v. Albania; See also H. Keller and D. Suter, in S. Besson (ed.), The
European Court of Human Rights after Protocol 14 – Preliminary Assessment and Perspectives, p. 85.
87. See also H. Keller, M. Forowicz and L. Engi, Friendly Settlements before the European Court of Human Rights, p. 104; H.
Keller and D. Suter, in S. Besson (ed.), The European Court of Human Rights after Protocol 14 – Preliminary Assessment
and Perspectives, p. 81; e.g. ECtHR, Ban´czyk and Sztuka v. Poland Application No. 20920/09, Judgment of 13 November
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In the information document on UDs, the ECtHR clarifies that redress should be provided in line
with its case-law on just satisfaction.88 Nevertheless, the ECtHR does not fully apply this case-law
in its UD rulings for two reasons. First, whilst the finding of a violation by the ECtHR may
constitute sufficient just satisfaction in itself,89 the acknowledgment of a violation in a UD does
not absolve the state from the duty of providing for other redress.90 Second, whilst requesting just
satisfaction, the applicant must ‘submit itemised particulars of all claims’91 under three headings
(pecuniary damage, non-pecuniary damage, and costs and expenses).92 Likewise, the ECtHR
makes its awards under these three headings.93 In their UDs, the states usually provide for a lump
sum without itemising sums per heading.94 At most, they deal with costs and expenses
separately.95
The ECtHR establishes whether the proposed amount ‘is approximately equivalent to’,96 ‘corre-
sponds to’,97 or ‘is comparable with’98 its awards in similar cases. These qualifications point out
what the ECtHR explains: that the sum should be ‘reasonable’ in comparison with, but does not need
to ‘correspond exactly to’, previous awards.99 This is also apparent from when the ECtHR rules that a
sum is too low, because it then notes that the sum ‘does not bear a reasonable relationship of
proportionality to’100 or ‘is substantially lower than’101 previous awards. The ECtHR’s leniency
may be explained by the fact that it permits the states to reduce the sum awarded previously by 10 per
cent in the case of an ‘unjustified refusal by the applicant of a friendly settlement’.102 Another reason
for its leniency may be that it is nigh impossible for the states to calculate precisely the required
amount, because the ECtHR relies on some general principles for calculating just satisfaction and
because its just-satisfaction case-law ‘is characterized by the lack of a consistently applied law of
damages at the level of detail which one would find in national systems’.103
Adequate redress, in short, is redress that corresponds to, and is not therefore substantially lower
than, the awards that the ECtHR made previously.
2012, para. 17; ECtHR, Gorfunkel v. Russia, Application No. 42974/07, Judgment of 19 September 2013, para. 26–27;
ECtHR, Topcˇic´-Rosenberg v. Croatia, Application No. 19391/11, Judgment of 14 November 2013, para. 29.
88. ECtHR, ‘Unilateral declarations: policy and practice’, ECtHR (2012), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Uni
lateral_declarations_ENG.pdf, p. 2. The ECtHR can award just satisfaction under Article 41 of the ECHR if a vio-
lation took place.
89. D. Harris et al., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (3rd edition, Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 157.
90. ECtHR, Strugaru v. Moldova, Application No. 44721/08, Judgment of 22 October 2012, para. 22.
91. Rule 60(2) of Rules of the Court.
92. European Court of Human Rights, ‘Practice Direction, Just Satisfaction claims’, European Court of Human Rights
(2016), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/PD_satisfaction_claims_ENG.pdf, para. 6.
93. D. Harris et al., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 157.
94. E.g. ECtHR, Yaprak and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 63746/10, Judgment of 28 February 2017; ECtHR,
Mures¸an v Romania, Application No. 33792/10, Judgment of 21 March 2017.
95. ECtHR, Veizi and Others v. Albania, Application No. 16191/13, Judgment of 28 March 2017.
96. ECtHR, Birulev and Shishkin v. Russia, Application No. 35919/05, Judgment of 14 June 2016, para. 41.
97. ECtHR, Urazov v. Russia, Application No. 42147/05, Judgment of 14 June 2016, para. 54.
98. ECtHR, Kotova and Others v. Russia, Application No. 3585/08, Judgment of 21 June 2016.
99. ECtHR, Wygoda v. Poland, Application No. 6738/12, Judgment of 22 November 2016, para. 24.
100. ECtHR, Cereale Flor S.a. and Rosca v. Moldova, Application No. 24042/09, Judgment of 14 February 2017, para. 29.
101. ECtHR, Hoszowski v. Poland, Application No. 40988/09, Judgment of 27 May 2014, para. 16.
102. ECtHR, ‘Unilateral declarations: policy and practice’, ECtHR (2012), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Uni
lateral_declarations_ENG.pdf, p. 2; H. Keller, M. Forowicz and L. Engi, Friendly Settlements before the European
Court of Human Rights, p. 147.
103. D. Harris et al., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 155.
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Exceptionally, the states promise to take non-monetary individuals measures, such as, the
enforcement of a domestic judgment that has remained unenforced.104 The ECtHR ‘welcomes
in principle’ redress in kind, provided the state describes it sufficiently clearly and certainly.105 For
example, when proposing to provide a flat to the applicant, the state should provide ‘sufficient
details of the flat in question’.106 Not including such measures can be a basis for rejection, for
example, when it means that the applicant continues to be in pre-trial detention in violation of
Article 5 ECHR (right to liberty and security).107 This is a grounds for refusal, because the
following principle, which applies to judgments in which the ECtHR finds a violation, applies
to UDs as well: that the state has a legal obligation to not only make reparation for the conse-
quences of the violation, but also to put an end to the violation.108 The remainder of this section
zooms in on two measures that feature in different UDs: conducting an investigation and reopening
domestic proceedings.
The states promise to investigate, for example, the death of the applicant’s relative109 or the
excessive use of force by the police.110 The inclusion of this undertaking in some UDs goes to
show that it is lacking in others, even when the state has admitted a substantive and procedural
violation of Article 3 ECHR111 or Article 2 ECHR.112 The ECtHR approves such UDs though
Article 2 ECHR requires ‘that there should be some form of effective official investigation when
individuals have been killed’.113 Moreover, ‘the obligation to carry out an effective investigation
into allegations of treatment infringing Article 3 ECHR suffered at the hands of State agents is well
established in the ECtHR’s case-law’ and ‘[i]n case of will-full ill-treatment the breach of Article 3
cannot be remedied only by an award of compensation to the victim’.114 Therefore, even when an
investigation is required, the ECtHR does not always require an undertaking to this effect to be
included in the UD, which makes it questionable whether the redress is indeed ‘adequate’ as
required by Rule 62A.
The state sometimes points out that the applicant is entitled to request the domestic courts to
reopen relevant domestic proceedings and the ECtHR may then take note of this possibility whilst
accepting the UD.115 In other cases, the applicants oppose a UD because they only have the right to
104. ECtHR, Yegupova and Others v. Ukraine, Application No. 21013/07, Judgment of 5 June 2012; see also ECtHR,
Kobylynsky and Others v. Ukraine, Application No. 1632/13, Judgment of 15 April 2014; ECtHR, Manukian v.
Georgia, Application No. 49448/08, Judgment of 3 May 2016; ECtHR, Veizi and Others v. Albania.
105. ECtHR, Delvina v. Albania, Application No. 49106/06, Judgment of 21 May 2013, para. 13.
106. Ibid., para 26.
107. ECtHR, Namaz and S¸enog˘lu v. Turkey, Application No. 69812/11, Judgment of 11 June 2013, para. 27; ECtHR,
Davlyashova v. Russia, Application No. 69863/13, Judgment of 18 October 2016.
108. ECtHR, Cereale Flor S.a. And Rosca v. Moldova, para. 28.
109. ECtHR, Nic Gibb v. Ireland, Application No. 17707/10, Judgment of 25 March 2014.
110. ECtHR, Gamtsemlidze v. Georgia, Application No. 2228/10, Judgment of 1 April 2014. See also ECtHR, Botchor-
ishvili v. Georgia, Application No. 652/10, Judgment of 30 June 2015; ECtHR, Tsaguria v. Georgia; ECtHR, Beridze
v. Georgia.
111. ECtHR, Fesik v. Ukraine, Application No. 2704/11, Judgment of 11 December 2012; ECtHR, Duminica˘ v. Moldova,
Application No. 77029/12, Judgment of 12 January 2016.
112. ECtHR, Vucovic v and Others v. Croatia, Application No. 3430/13, Judgment of 28 August 2015; ECtHR, Prasz-
kiewicz v. Poland, Application No. 50508/13, Judgment of 13 October 2015.
113. ECtHR, Uc¸ar v. Turkey, Application No. 52392/99, Judgment of 11 April 2006, para. 90.
114. ECtHR, Jeronovicˇs v. Latvia, para. 103–104.
115. ECtHR, Egiazaryan v. Georgia, Application No. 40085/09, Judgment of 24 November 2015, para. 22–30; See also
ECtHR, Molashvili v. Georgia, Application No. 39726/04, Judgment of 30 September 2014, para. 33–34.
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apply for reopening their domestic cases if the ECtHR finds a violation in a judgment.116 The
ECtHR may agree with them and reject a UD for that reason, because the reopening of proceedings
is sometimes the ‘most efficient, if not the only, means of achieving restitutio in integrum’.117
The states can also commit to taking general measures not specifically relating to the applicant,
although this cannot substitute for individual redress. They promise to take such measures to avoid
similar violations in the future,118 but do so rarely. Albania promised, for example, to prevent,
promptly investigate, and adequately punish acts of violence against detainees.119 More com-
monly, the states point out that they have already taken general measures, usually in the form
of new legislation.120 Pointing this out can be of relevance, because the ECtHR can find a reason to
reject a UD in the case of a failure to propose general measures that would address a structural
problem causing repetitive applications.121
7. After the strike-out decision
This section looks beyond the strike-out decision. It examines the role of the Committee and the
ECtHR in supervising the implementation of UDs and the effect of a UD on the applicant’s case at
the domestic level.
A. The Committee of Ministers
The Committee only supervises the execution of judgments, not decisions,122 and the ECtHR
strikes out a UD in a decision, unless it has declared the application inadmissible.123 Therefore,
the Committee does not normally supervise the execution of UDs.124 Practice confirms this, as the
ECtHR rarely strikes out a UD in a judgment. This happens only when a UD is concerned with the
reserved Article 41 ECHR procedure during which the ECtHR determines whether to award just
satisfaction to the applicant or only part of a complaint, which means the ECtHR rules on the
merits of the other parts in a judgment. There are two exceptions to the rule that the Committee
does not supervise decisions: first, when the ECtHR awards costs in a decision,125 which it hardly
ever does, and, second, when the ECtHR strikes-out a case based on a friendly settlement.126 The
Committee’s supervision of the implementation of a UD, therefore, depends on factors that one
116. ECtHR, Vojteˇchova´ v. Slovakia, Application No. 59102/08, Judgment of 25 September 2012, para. 25.
117. ECtHR, Davydov v. Russia, Application No. 18967/07, Judgment of 30 October 2014, para. 27.
118. ECtHR, Ivanovas v. Latvia, Application No. 25769/02, Judgment of 4 December 2012; ECtHR, D.P. v. Lithuania,
Application No. 27920/08, Judgment of 22 October 2013; ECtHR, Danivlos v. Latvia, Application No. 38449/05,
Judgment of 1 September 2015.
119. ECtHR, Ceka v. Albania, Application No. 26872/05, Judgment of 23 October 2012.
120. E.g. ECtHR, Schulz v. Germany, Application No. 4800/12, Judgment of 31 March 2015; ECtHR, N.J.D.B. v. the UK,
Application No. 76760/12, Judgment of 27 October 2015; ECtHR, Zavros v. Cyprus.
121. ECtHR, Przemyk v. Poland, para. 41; ECtHR, Tahirov v. Azerbaijan, para. 40; ECtHR, Annagi Hajibeyli v. Azer-
baijan, Application No. 2204/11, Judgment of 22 October 2015, para. 41.
122. Article 46(2) of the ECHR.
123. Rule 43(3) of the Rules of the Court.
124. L.R. Glas, The Theory, Potential and Practice of Procedural Dialogue in the European Convention on Human Rights
System, p. 296-297.
125. Rule 43(4) of the Rules of the Court.
126. Provided they are approved under Article 39 of the ECHR.
Glas 621
would not expect to determine this: the applicant’s agreement, the UD’s scope, and the stage of
proceedings in which the UD is filed.
Since the Committee does not systemically supervise the implementation of UDs, we do not
know if the states implement them (unless the applicant requests the ECtHR to restore an appli-
cation, which happens seldom). Nor do we know whether they pay redress on time,127 which is
something the Committee does register for judgments and friendly settlements.128
B. The ECtHR
In its strike-out decisions, the ECtHR regularly recalls that it may restore an application that it
struck out of its list if exceptional circumstances so justify.129 It may therefore scrutinize the
UD twice: before striking a case out and after that.130 In the latter scenario, it may interpret the
terms of the UD and its strike-out decision.131 The ECtHR’s competence to verify the state’s
compliance with its undertakings is odd because it does not have the jurisdiction to verify
whether a state has complied with the obligations imposed on it by a judgment132 or a friendly
settlement.133
Does the ECtHR also regularly restore an application that it struck out based on a UD? The
Grand Chamber noted in Jeronovicˇs v. Latvia of 5 July 2016 that it had restored only one Russian
case of 29 applicants.134 This appears to be incorrect, because the ECtHR had noted in previous
rulings that it had restored: two Armenian cases (of five applicants),135 two Ukrainian cases (of two
applicants)136 and 11 Russian cases (of 11 applicants).137 In the period after Jeronovicˇs, the ECtHR
restored another three cases (of four applicants).138 The ECtHR therefore restored nine cases (of 51
applicants) in the five-year period.
The reasons for restoration of the cases mentioned in the previous paragraph were as follows: in
one case, the state’s representative and the applicants requested restoration because the state had
provided the ECtHR with erroneous information whilst submitting the UD.139 Two other cases
were restored because the state did not pay the sum of money140 and another case was restored
127. They usually commit to pay interest if they fail to pay within three months from the date of notification of the
decision. This deadline is comparable to the deadline for just-satisfaction payments, ECtHR, ‘Practice Direction, Just
Satisfaction claims’, European ECtHR of Human Rights (2016), para. 25.
128. Based on Article 46(2) of the ECHR. The Committee publishes relevant statistics in its annual reports.
129. ECtHR, Jeronovicˇs v. Latvia, para. 67.
130. Ibid., para 69.
131. Ibid., para. 70.
132. Article 46(2) of the ECHR; ECtHR, Kafkaris v. Cyprus, Application No. 9644/09, Admissibility Proceedings of 21
June 2011, para. 74.
133. Article 39(4) of the ECHR.
134. ECtHR, Jeronovicˇs v. Latvia, para. 68; Referring to ECtHR, Aleksentseva and 28 Others v. Russia, Application No.
75025/01, Restoral to the List, 23 March 2006.
135. ECtHR, Ghasabyan and Others v. Armenia, Application No. 23566/05, Judgment of 13 November 2014, para. 4–5;
ECtHR, Baghdasaryan and Zarikyants v. Armenia, Application No. 43242/05, Judgment of 13 November 2014, para. 5.
136. ECtHR, Yavorovenko and Others v. Ukraine, Application No. 25663/02, Judgment of 17 July 2014, para. 10.
137. ECtHR, Khuchbarov and Others v. Russia, Application No. 20830/07, Judgment of 18 February 2014, para. 5.
138. See the cases mentioned in footnotes 139 and 140.
139. ECtHR, Malikov and Oshchepkov v. Russia, Application No. 42981/06, Judgment of 12 November 2015, para. 6, 37.
140. ECtHR, Ivashchenko v. Ukraine, Application No. 18453/09, Judgment of 24 November 2015; ECtHR, Fedorova v.
Ukraine, Application No. 43768/12, Restored to the List, 1 March 2016.
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because the state had failed to enforce domestic judgments.141 The Russian cases of eleven appli-
cants were restored, because the UDs dealt only with the conditions of the detention issue, whilst the
complaints of two applicants were also related to the excessive length of pre-trial detention.142 The
ECtHR immediately struck these cases out based on a new UD after it had restored them, because
Russia also took into consideration the other complaints in the new UD.143 The ECtHR, therefore,
gave Russia a second chance that the state hardly deserved, considering that it had submitted an
incomplete UD (which the ECtHR should probably not have approved). The ECtHR did not explain
why it restored the two Armenian cases of five applicants, but this was, taking into account the terms
of the UD, probably because Armenia had not given the applicants a flat.
Keller, Forowicz and Engi expected in 2010 that more applications would be restored ‘once the
ECtHR starts using friendly settlements and UDs more frequently in cases concerning countries with
systemic problems’.144 Back then, only one restoration decision had been taken in respect of a UD.
This expectation has become true, because the ECtHR has indeed restored more applications. Com-
pared to the number of UDs approved, however, the number of restoration decisions is still low and
these decisions are not yet regular phenomenon. It is unknown if this is so because the states meticu-
lously execute the UDs or because the applicants do not have the energy, time and/or resources to go to
Strasbourg again, particularly because the ECtHR takes the restoration decision separately from the
new ruling on the merits. Consequently, an application may only result in a judgment more than nine
years after it was lodged (and struck out and restored in the meantime).145 Another explanation may be
that we simply do not yet know that more applications have been restored. Some restoration decisions
could not be found on HUDOC. These decisions, therefore, probably taken by a Committee of three
judges in a letter or by a single judge, are not published.146 Even so, we know of their existence, because
the ECtHR referred to them in its subsequent judgment on the merits.147
Even when the ECtHR does not restore a case to its list, it may become involved again after it
has approved a UD. This happened in Jeronovicˇs, when the state admitted inter alia that the
applicant’s ill-treatment by police officers and the effectiveness of the investigation into his
complaints did not meet the Article 3 ECHR standards.148 Jeronovicˇs filed a new application after
that, alleging that the domestic authorities’ refusal to reopen domestic proceedings concerning his
ill-treatment as acknowledged in the UD violated Article 3 ECHR.149 The ECtHR agreed and
found a violation of Article 3 ECHR.150
C. Effect of the strike-out decision on the case at the domestic level
The states sometimes include the following clause in their UDs: ‘the payment will constitute the
final resolution of the case’.151 Contrarily, the states may confirm that the UD does not exempt
141. ECtHR, Yavorovenko and Others v. Ukraine, para. 7.
142. ECtHR, Khuchbarov and Others v. Russia.
143. Ibid., para. 20.
144. H. Keller, M. Forowicz and L. Engi, Friendly Settlements before the European Court of Human Rights, p. 172.
145. ECtHR, Malikov and Oshchepkov v. Russia.
146. Rules 53(5) and 52A(1) of the Rules of the Court.
147. E.g. ECtHR, Malikov and Oshchepkov v. Russia, para. 6. See also the Armenian cases cited above.
148. ECtHR, Jeronovicˇs v. Latvia, para. 19.
149. Ibid., para. 3.
150. Ibid., para. 123–124.
151. ECtHR, Fesik v Ukraine.
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them from, for example, their obligation to enforce a domestic judgment delivered in the appli-
cant’s favour.152 The question is, therefore, what the effect of a strike-out decision is on the
applicant’s case. A comparable and more specific question arises against the background of section
6.D.3, in which it was established that UDs do not always contain the undertaking to investigate a
violation of Article 2 or 3 ECHR even when the ECHR standards require it. The question is,
therefore, also if the applicants may still request an investigation at the domestic level after the
ECtHR struck a case out and when the UD did not contain an undertaking to that effect.
It can already be derived from the strike-out rulings that a UD does not need to be the final
resolution of a case because the ECtHR sometimes emphasizes that its decision constitutes a final
resolution of the application only as far as the Strasbourg proceedings are concerned. Its decision
is, therefore, ‘without prejudice to the use by the applicant of any other remedies that may be
available ( . . . ) at the domestic level’153 and to the state’s continuing obligation to conduct an
investigation,154 as the ECtHR sometimes emphasizes in its decision.155
8. Conclusion and recommendations
In this section, the article returns to its aims as formulated in the introduction and it makes some
recommendations based on the conclusion.
A. Conclusion
The first aim of the article was to establish whether UDs are indeed (mostly) used to dispose of
repetitive applications, and how this works in practice. UDs are indeed mostly used for this
purpose, but not exclusively: the ECtHR also strikes out non-repetitive applications, even when
relevant case-law only exists in the form of judgments against states other than the respondent
state, as was described in section 6.C.2. As it has been explained in the introduction, the ECtHR
and the states parties have welcomed UDs, because they can help dispose of repetitive applications
in an efficient way. UDs indeed function in that way in practice for the states, because the approval
rate is high and because UDs are usually short. Moreover, the ECtHR permits the states to pass
over friendly-settlement negotiations if an application is repetitive. The ECtHR has enhanced the
UD’s efficiency by usually issuing rather short rulings (limited to verifying compliance with three
conditions and without summarising the facts of each case) and by joining different applications in
one ruling. As the introduction noted, the ECtHR and the states parties agree not only that
repetitive applications should be disposed of efficiently, but also that their root cause should be
addressed. The states pay attention to this other aspect when they point out which general remedial
measure they have already taken, but overlook it when they include the clause ‘in the special
circumstances’ of the applicant’s case when the circumstances are not so ‘special’. The ECtHR
152. ECtHR, Agakishiyev v. Azerbaijan, Application No. 43921/12, Judgment of 21 October 2014; ECtHR, Zeynalova v.
Azerbaijan, Application No. 21718/12, Judgment of 8 September 2015; ECtHR, Zulfugarov v. Azerbaijan, Appli-
cation No. 40413/12, Judgment of 8 September 2015.
153. ECtHR, Taktakishvili v. Georgia, Application No. 46055/06, Judgment of 16 October 2012, para. 27. See also ECtHR,
Tchikashvili and Others v. Georgia, Application No. 61783/11, Judgment of 30 June 2015, para. 15.
154. ECtHR, Jeronovicˇs v. Latvia, para. 118.
155. ECtHR, Vucovic v and Others v. Croatia, para. 22; compare, ECtHR, Jeronovicˇs v. Latvia, Dissenting opinion of
Judge Silvis (joined by six others), para. 6.
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does not comment on the inclusion of this clause. Nor does it normally verify whether the state has
taken such measures whilst approving a UD in a repetitive application. At the same time, the
ECtHR does sometimes remind the state of the importance of general measures by not accepting a
UD for the failure to undertake general measures. It is, therefore, likely that the ECtHR finds it
unnecessary to emphasize this aspect when it knows that the state is taking such measures.
The second aim of this article is to establish whether the interests of the applicants are suffi-
ciently protected when the ECtHR rules on UDs, by verifying whether the ECtHR and the states
abide by the relevant rules and by looking into the matter of supervising the implementation of
UDs and of the effect of UDs on the domestic case.
The analysis based on Articles 37 and 39 ECHR has shown that the ECtHR does not always
apply the relevant rules consistently: it did not always strike out an application under Article 39
ECHR in the case of an accepted UD and it exceptionally struck out cases under Article 37(1)(a)
ECHR when the applicants did not comment on the UD. Further, the ECtHR applies only one
Tahsin Acar factor in virtually all rulings (the ‘not a new issue’ factor); the other factors hardly
play a role of any significance. Although Rule 62A requires that a UD is preceded by friendly-
settlement negotiations, the ECtHR also approves UDs that that were not preceded by such
negotiations. The ECtHR accepts that the states do not fulfil this requirement in repetitive and
some non-repetitive cases. It, however, refuses to accept UDs that do not contain the two essential
requirements, which happens exceptionally. The standard for complying with these requirements is
not very demanding though: the ECtHR approves UDs that do not refer to a specific ECHR
provision and those containing a rather general acknowledgment. Moreover, it accepts UDs con-
taining an ex gratia payment, UDs that do not contain an undertaking to investigate,156 and UDs
that stress that the payment constitutes ‘the final resolution of the case’.157 In conclusion, the
interests of the applicants seem to be guarded well generally from the perspective of the applicable
rules, because the ECtHR enforces at least the two essential requirements. Nevertheless, improve-
ments are possible and where this is the case, recommendations follow below.
The Strasbourg institutions hardly ever supervise the implementation of a UD. The ECtHR only
does so after a request for restoral. Requesting this is burdensome for the applicants, because they
must bring a second complaint of their own motion, which is only likely to be successful if the state
has not taken action for quite some time. Moreover, the ECtHR takes a restoration decision and
examines the merits of a new complaint in two separate rulings. The Committee’s rare involvement
depends on factors that one would not expect to determine this. One of these factors may even be an
incentive for applicants to accept a UD, because the Committee supervises the implementation of
friendly settlements. This incentive goes against the ECtHR’s warning that UDs are ‘not intended
( . . . ) to circumvent the applicant’s opposition to a friendly settlement’.158 From the implementation
perspective therefore, the applicants’ interests are not guarded well on the level of the Council of
Europe. This holds especially when it is recalled that the Committee supervises the implementation
of friendly settlements and that there is no cogent reason for making a difference between friendly
settlements and UDs in this regard. As for the other aspect, the effect of a UD on the applicant’s
domestic case, it is notable that some UDs suggest that they form the final resolution of a case,
although this is not necessarily true. It is also notable that obligations on domestic actors, which
156. Even when this obligation exists due to an Article 2 or 3 ECHR violation.
157. Although an investigation is still required.
158. ECtHR, Jeronovicˇs v. Latvia, para. 117.
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continue to exist after the approval of a UD, are not always included in the document. From this
perspective therefore, there is room for improvement to better protect the applicant.
B. Recommendations
The conclusion is not only that UDs are employed to deal with repetitive applications in an
efficient manner, but also that there is room for improvement, and therefore for recommendations,
when it comes to protecting the applicants’ interests. The recommendations balance between better
protection of the applicants’ interests and not imposing overly strict standards, because such
standards would lead to a lower acceptance rate of UDs by the ECtHR. This effect would make
the recommendations unappealing for the ECtHR and the states, because they regard UDs as an
efficient tool for dealing with repetitive cases. Additionally, some recommendations help ensure
that the ECtHR and the states do not lose sight of the importance of remedying the structural
problem at the root of repetitive applications.
It is recommended that the Committee becomes responsible for supervising the implemen-
tation of all UDs.159 The Council of Europe’s Steering Committee for Human Rights did not
consider this desirable, because the possibility of restoration by the ECtHR ‘provides sufficient
safeguards to the applicant’.160 However, supervision by the ECtHR is very burdensome for
the applicant. Furthermore, when the ECtHR strikes out many repetitive cases based on a UD, the
structural problem causing the complaints or the scale of that problem may escape its and
the Committee’s attention, especially because it usually does not verify whether the state has
taken general measures in response to previous rulings. Systematic supervision by the Commit-
tee addresses this matter too.161 This recommendation can be implemented in two ways: the
ECtHR could approve UDs in judgments162 or Article 39 ECHR could be amended to give the
Committee jurisdiction over UDs.163
Furthermore, the ECtHR is recommended to always strike out a case under Article 39 ECHR
if an applicant agrees to the UD, so that applicants in similar circumstances are treated similarly.
For the same reason and since the document is unilateral, the ECtHR is recommended to
continue ruling based on a UD, regardless of whether the applicant sent observations. This is
also in the interest of the applicant, because, if the ECtHR invokes Article 37(1)(a) ECHR
instead, it does not strike out a case based on the UD and the state does not have to implement
the UD’s terms. To clarify the effect of a UD on the domestic case, the ECtHR could require the
159. See also Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, ‘Victors Jeronovicˇs v Latvia Written Comments’, Helsinki Foun-
dation for Human Rights (2015).
160. Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH), ‘Report on the longer-term future of the system of the European
Convention on Human Rights’, CDDH (2015), para. 167.
161. These measures would also clarify if states abide by UDs. In addition, leaving supervision to the ECtHR does not fit
the Convention system as explained above.
162. The ECtHR did this to make the Committee supervise friendly settlements; see Council of Europe, ‘Explanatory
Report to Protocol No. 14 ECHR’, Council of Europe (2014), https://rm.coe.int/16800d380f, para. 94.
163. See also L. Abdelgawad, ‘Role of the Committee of Ministers (Presentation at Conference on the Long-term Future of
the European Court of Human Rights in Oslo)’, CoE (2014), https://edoc.coe.int/en/conferences-on-the-future-of-the-
european-court-of-human-rights/7307-conference-on-the-long-term-future-of-the-european-court-of-human-rights-
oslo-7-8-april-2014.html; L.R. Glas, The Theory, Potential and Practice of Procedural Dialogue in the European
Convention on Human Rights System, p. 558.
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states always to promise to take those measures (for example conducting an investigation) that
the ECHR standards require.164
The last recommendation requires the ECtHR to become stricter. Since the recommendations aim
to achieve a balance between strictness and efficiency, the ECtHR is not recommended to become
stricter on the remaining points for improvement. Instead, the ECtHR is recommended to clarify
further the standards that a UD should fulfil. More clarity helps the states to draft clearer, more
complete, and more human-rights-friendly UDs, improvements that would be in the interest of both
the applicant and the ECtHR. Additionally, more clarity may stimulate the states to adopt more
UDs.165 The ECtHR can enhance clarity by adopting a practice direction on UDs. The ECtHR’s
president may adopt such a document ‘notably in relation to such matters as ( . . . ) the filing of
pleadings and other documents’.166 Appendix 2 outlines the points that the ECtHR could address in a
practice direction on UDs. In this way, the ECtHR can continue to use UDs as an efficient means of
dealing with repetitive applications, without losing sight of the interests of the applicants.
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165. The CDDH noted that there may be ‘more room’ for inter alia using UDs although the procedure ‘should be better
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Appendix 1
Table 1. Applicant’s response to and ECtHR’s decision on UDs, 2 April 2012 to 1 April 2017.
2/4/12
to 1/4/13
2/4/13
to 1/4/14
2/4/14
to 1/4/15
2/4/15
to 1/4/16
2/4/16
to 1/4/17 Total
C A C A C A C A C A C A
Applicant’s response
Acc. 13 160 19 27 21 25 30 652 17 398 100 1262
% 8.33 19.66 7.51 5.04 7.09 0.59 10.34 16.91 5.86 15.55 7.78 10.51
R/NC 143 654 234 509 275 4216 260 3204 273 2162 1185 10,745
% 91.67 80.34 92.49 94.96 92.91 99.41 89.66 83.09 94.14 84.45 92.23 89.49
ECtHR’s decision
UD 136 637 220 493 266 3927 247 3669 260 2141 1129 10,867
% 87.18 78.26 86.96 91.98 89.86 992.60 85.17 95.15 89.66 83.63 87.86 90.51
FS 10 156 15 22 18 22 28 165 17 398 88 763
% 6.41 19.16 5.93 4.10 6.08 0.52 9.66 4.28 5.86 15.55 6.85 6.35
R 10 21 18 21 12 292 15 22 13 21 68 377
% 6.41 2.58 7.1 3.92 4.06 6.88 5.17 0.57 4.48 0.82 5.29 3.14
C: Cases; A: Applicants; R/NC: Rejected or no comment; UD: Accepted as unilateral declaration; FR: Accepted as friendly
settlement; R: Rejected.
Table 2. UDs per state, 2 April 2012 to 1 April 2017.
2/4/12
to 1/4/13
2/4/13
to 1/4/14
2/4/14
to 1/4/15
2/4/15
to 1/4/16
2/4/16
to 1/4/17
Total
per state
C A C A C A C A C A C A
Albania 2 2 1 3 1 1 4 7 8 13
Armenia 3 19 1 1 4 20
Azerbaijan 4 5 12 13 8 8 24 26
Belgium 1 1 1 1 2 2
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 4 3 6 1 1 3 3 8 14
Bulgaria 8 44 3 9 4 7 6 7 3 5 24 72
Croatia 5 17 3 4 6 11 3 3 17 35
Cyprus 1 1 1 1
Czech Republic 4 13 9 10 1 1 14 24
Estonia 1 1 1 1 2 2
Finland 5 5 1 1 6 6
France 3 3 2 3 9 12 1 1 1 1 16 20
Georgia 1 1 8 13 20 23 17 30 5 5 51 72
Germany 2 9 2 5 3 3 1 1 5 5 13 23
Greece 24 57 7 22 31 79
Hungary 3 3 2 5 5 8
Italy 11 27 17 33 11 3329 62 2197 31 794 132 6380
Ireland 2 2 2 2
Latvia 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 4 5 8
(continued)
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Appendix 2
Based on the conclusion, the ECtHR could address the following points in the practice direction on
UDs, such as:
 whether there are other ‘exceptional circumstances’ than the repetitive nature of a complaint
that justify passing over the friendly-settlement negotiations;
 the ECtHR invites applicants to submit comments about a UD:
 and if they do not reply, the ECtHR assumes that they disagree with the terms of the UD
and assesses whether the UD provides a basis for striking the application out under
Article 37(1)(c) ECHR;
 and if they accept the UD, the ECtHR treats the UD as a friendly settlement and strikes
out the application under Article 39 ECHR.
 respect for the ECHR rights (see Article 37(1) ECHR) implies that:
 the states should not adopt a UD if the facts are in dispute between the parties;
 the states should explain in the UD which general measures they have taken to solve the
root cause of repetitive applications, especially when this has not yet been clarified in a
previous ruling of the ECtHR; and
 the ECtHR must have established clear and extensive case-law concerning the topic of
the complaint in respect of the respondent state before it can approve a UD.
Table 2. (continued)
2/4/12
to 1/4/13
2/4/13
to 1/4/14
2/4/14
to 1/4/15
2/4/15
to 1/4/16
2/4/16
to 1/4/17
Total
per state
C A C A C A C A C A C A
Liechtenstein 1 1 1 1
Lithuania 1 1 1 1
Malta 1 1 1 7 2 8
Moldova 4 4 10 52 6 15 5 6 3 6 28 83
Montenegro 8 12 8 12
Netherlands 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 7
Poland 1 1 60 63 27 31 28 29 15 16 131 140
Portugal 29 31 6 6 6 21 4 6 5 16 50 80
Romania 16 113 21 25 83 109 41 189 39 110 200 546
Russia 11 169 24 105 41 209 32 128 80 312 188 923
Serbia 5 5 8 8 12 57 7 12 4 5 36 87
Slovakia 4 7 3 3 3 3 6 6 3 3 19 22
Slovenia 1 1 1 1 2 2
Sweden 1 1 1 1
FYROM 1 10 12 71 21 94 6 10 6 6 46 191
Turkey 12 16 21 26 7 11 14 25 32 406 86 484
Ukraine 24 322 23 56 20 292 10 1,121 28 809 105 2600
United Kingdom 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 1 1 12 12
Total 156 814 253 536 296 8310 290 3856 290 2560 1285 12,007
UD: unilateral declaration; FYROM: Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
Glas 629
 The UD is not necessarily the final resolution of a case on the domestic level, because the
respondent state may still need to take individual and/or general measures (even when it
does not undertake to implement these measures in the UD, although these measures are
preferably included in the UD).
 An acknowledgment of a violation must:
 cover the entire complaint (for example the entire duration of the applicant’s detention);
 relate to a specific right;
 be as specific as possible (for example clarify which acts/omissions have caused the
violation); and
 not be followed by the clause ‘in the special circumstances’ of the applicant’s case if the
case does not concern an isolated problem.
 Adequate redress generally:
 imposes on the respondent state a legal obligation to put an end to the violation and
make reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the
situation;
 is more than the acknowledgement of a violation because it also requires individual and
possibly general measures; and
 should be described sufficiently clearly and certainly.
 Adequate monetary redress:
 must be reasonable in comparison to the amounts that the ECtHR has awarded in similar
cases and therefore cannot be substantially lower than that;
 is as far as possible itemized under three headings (pecuniary damage, non-pecuniary
damage, and costs and expenses); and
 cannot be ex gratia.
 Adequate non-monetary redress:
 is welcomed in principle and may be indispensable depending on the nature of the
violation (for example, releasing the applicant from detention contrary to Article 5
ECHR);
 may require an investigation in case of an acknowledgment of an Article 2 or 3 ECHR
violation; and
 may require that the applicant can request the reopening of relevant domestic proceed-
ings based on the acknowledgment in the UD.
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